









evelopments since the previous OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook was finalised in autumn 2000
have brought substantial changes to the short-term
outlook for the world economy.Even if a U.S.slow-
down – after some 6 percent output growth in the
first half of 2000 – was anticipated, such an abrupt
correction as appears to have taken place was only
indicated as a risk. In addition, the economic situa-
tion in Japan, while difficult to interpret, appears
poised for further deflation and disappointing
growth.Finally,some financial instability has resur-
faced in emerging markets, hit-
ting the Turkish economy. The
OECD is currently in the
process of producing its new
Outlook, and we are, of course,
taking these developments into
account in our projections.
While it is too early to discuss a
consistent set of short to medi-
um-term projections, I shall, at
this point, highlight what I see
as the key issues affecting the
outlook and provide an assess-
ment of developments based on the information
currently at hand.
Recent developments 
The outlook for US growth has changed rapidly
since the end of last year, as the actual slowdown
occurred substantially faster than the large majori-
ty of forecasters had considered as the most likely
outcome (Figure 1). Some slowing of growth had
been expected, driven by the tightening of US
monetary policy since June 1999, the actual and
projected weakening of equity prices, and the
impact of rising energy prices on real incomes. In
addition, a sharper slowdown had been considered
(in particular in the most recent OECD Economic
Outlook), although mainly as a risk that might
result if financial market conditions (especially
equity prices and risk premia) were to deteriorate
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Figure 1further and spill over into business and consumer
confidence.
US financial market conditions did in fact deterio-
rate further in the fourth quarter.Equity prices fell
sharply and risk spreads on corporate bonds
picked up (Figure 2).Real economy indicators also
softened, driven by exceptionally weak capital
goods spending, a drop in real exports and a
marked slowing in consumption (Figure 3). At the
same time, real inventories increased while final
sales of goods declined. Initial claims for unem-
ployment compensation continued to rise through-
out the quarter,and both the purchasing managers’
index of business conditions in the manufacturing
sector and widely looked at
measures of consumer senti-
ment/confidence dropped
sharply in the final months of
the year and continued to fall in
January and February.
In Japan, economic activity has
seemed unable to pick up in a
self-sustaining fashion, and
deflation has continued. While
recovery in Japan may still be
underway,the pace appears to be
slower than had been thought.
Corporate sector profits and a
weaker yen have helped, despite
higher real interest rates, to
underpin business investment,
but while, as expected, public
investment has slowed, real net
exports have started to decline
with weaker growth in the
United States and the economies
of East Asia. Moreover, the
weak income growth, due in part
to restructuring, has evidently
restrained private consumption.
Even more importantly, perhaps,
there are renewed concerns
about the financial sector in
Japan, amid indications of the
need for further significant bal-
ance sheet adjustments by banks
and some major adjustments as
well by life insurance companies.
Finally, wholesale and consumer
prices are continuing to decline
despite higher energy prices, in
part due to deregulation in a number of key sectors,
but probably also in response to sustained weakness
in aggregate demand.
Economic activity in Europe also appears to be slow-
ing a bit, but its performance still looks relatively
good and is not much different from what was expect-
ed a few months ago. Export growth has slowed in
part as the boost from the earlier depreciation of the
euro ended and foreign demand dropped.The growth
of investment spending has softened as business con-
fidence indicators have slipped slightly. Consumption
spending has remained strong, however, with con-
sumer confidence near record levels and employment
continuing to grow rapidly.
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For most of the rest of the OECD area, develop-
ments seem to be broadly in line with what was
expected some months ago. Korea, however, may
be affected more than others by the U.S. slowdown
and the fall in demand of ICT products, given its
export specialisation in the ICT component pro-
ducing sector. In Turkey, the situation is serious in
that it marks a significant setback in the attempt to
achieve stabilisation objectives.
The situation in the non-OECD area softened in the
second half of last year,as the U.S.slowdown and the
fall in demand for semiconductors and other electri-
cal goods is likely to have significantly reduced
export growth also in dynamic Asia.South American
countries, which have weaker trading ties with the
United States, have been less affected than Asia by
the slowing of economic activity in the United
States. Output growth in the oil-exporting countries
is rising in line with expectations and provided the
price of oil does not drop sharply the economic out-
look for these countries is generally favourable.
The U.S. correction
Against this background, much of our revised view
of the global outlook will depend on how we see
economic activity in the United States evolving. In
this regard, the key issue is to form an assessment
on whether the slowdown since late 2000 is transi-
tory and mostly due to temporary factors or
whether it presages a protracted period of adjust-
ment. It is important, therefore, to try to under-
stand the nature of the factors behind the recent
developments that have been taking place in the
United States. Significant pieces of data are, how-
ever, still missing and, as a consequence, any analy-
sis at this point can only be preliminary.
Nonetheless, one can tentatively identify a few key
Figure 3: Recent Economic Indicators in the United States
a) Excluding aircraft. – b) Three-month moving average, percentage change from three months earlier at annual rate. – c) Level of shipments
in December relative to fourth quarter at an annual rate. – d) The average balance of opinions on production expectations, order-books and
stocks.
Source: Bloomberg, Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Datastream, Employment and Training Administration.forces that likely contributed to the slowdown in
the United States and speculate about others.
Transitory factors
One element that seems to have been important
has been the exceptionally cold weather in the
United States in November and December, which
likely suppressed retail sales during that period
and also construction activity. The impact, howev-
er, on the economy is transitory and may, to the
extent that some purchases are only delayed, spur
output in coming months.
A related factor has been the high price of energy
(both oil and natural gas), which together with
apparently limited stocks of refined products, such
as home heating oil and gasoline, led to increased
final product prices and must have absorbed a larg-
er-than-normal share of discretionary income.
Since December of last year, crude oil prices have
eased back a bit from recent peaks, as additional
crude oil production entered the market, heating
oil stocks began to recover and energy demand
softened. These developments were expected six
months ago when the OECD was finalising its cur-
rent published set of projections, but the changes
have come earlier than anticipated. Moreover,
while oil and commodity markets are inherently
volatile,it is reasonable to believe that the risk of a
substantial additional hike in oil prices has abated.
Other elements, advanced by some commentators,
have been the protracted periods for settling the
outcome of the US presidential election and the
electricity utility crisis in California (one of the
world’s largest economies).These may have served
to puncture confidence. The somewhat nebulous
nature of confidence, however, makes it difficult to
assess these influences. But to the extent that these
forces did play a role, their impact is also likely to
be transitory.
Areas of greater uncertainty
Stock adjustment effects appear to have been pre-
sent in the demand for computing and telecommu-
nications equipment, whose growth declined
sharply at year-end.The slowdown followed a peri-
od of exceptional demand growth, which was
reflected both in the process of strong capital
deepening and in the rapid rise in the equity price
of ICT producing firms. ICT expenditures were by
far the fastest growing component of investment
spending over the past two to three years and
accounted for more than a third of all business
investment in 1999 and 2000. Recently, adverse
profit movements have helped to reduce what have
appeared for some time to be clearly overvalued
stock prices of several ICT firms.
There also seems to have been a significant stock
adjustment taking place in the demand for durable
consumer goods in the last months of 2000,particu-
larly in the motor vehicles sector, which had
enjoyed several years of strong growth before the
second half of the year.This downward adjustment
in the demand for automobiles as consumers work
off existing stocks was possibly influenced also by
high gasoline prices. In addition, investment
demand for trucks appears to have dropped off sig-
nificantly at the end of last year, probably for sim-
ilar reasons.
The fourth quarter also saw a fall of U.S. exports in
nearly all categories of goods.A significant portion
of the drop was in aircraft, which are typically
volatile, and in semiconductors and ICT equip-
ment. It is not clear, however, what factors were
behind the generalised drop-off in exports.
Even if the slowdown in investment, given signs of
over-capacity in some sectors, was to an extent
anticipated, it appears to have exceeded expecta-
tions. Rather than occurring smoothly over time, a
sharp correction has taken place. The interaction
between profit movements, stock price develop-
ments, consumer and business confidence (the
“animal spirits”) is obviously very complex.
Especially labour market consequences have to be
watched with care, as they will be crucial in deter-
mining the path of consumer expenditures. Finally,
as a result of the sharp correction in final demand,
an inventory adjustment is also to be expected,
which adds some uncertainty to the timing of the
recovery in activity growth.
An assessment
Positive developments
In many respects, recent developments have been










appropriate and reasonable, even if their timing
was not well predicted. In addition, the favourable
background against which these adjustments have
occurred might ease concerns about the likely
severity of the slowdown overall.
An orderly decline in US equity prices
Equity prices, especially in the high-technology
sectors, were by most estimates too high in recent
years. It seemed almost inevitable that an adjust-
ment would eventually occur, and the risk was that
such an adjustment, when it did occur, might over-
shoot its true equilibrium and destabilise econom-
ic activity. However, what we saw in the past year
was a large but reasonably orderly decline of equi-
ty prices, most notably in the high-technology sec-
tor, where it was believed that such an adjustment
was most needed. Current prices clearly reflect
more reasonable prospects for earnings growth
than those of a year ago, although valuations may
still be a bit high relative to historical norms.
Continuing productivity growth in the United
States
US labour productivity continued to grow in the
fourth quarter,at a rate similar to those of previous
quarters. This is encouraging in part because the
end of a cycle is typically accompanied by a sharp
slowdown in labour productivity growth, as firms
are less able to adjust employment when demand
for output falls.
The productivity figures serve to reinforce the view
that there has been a structural shift in the U.S.
economy. Sustained strong increases in productivi-
ty compared with the performance of recent
decades support the conclusion that the trend rate
of growth of potential output in the United States
has improved. Indeed, OECD estimates of U.S.
potential growth have been revised up on several
occasions over the past few years.The most recent
upward revision was late last year, when potential
growth was increased to around 4 per cent. This
compares with an estimate of 23/4 per cent in 1998.
An implication of the improvement in potential,
which is consistent with temporarily subdued infla-
tionary pressure, is a reassessment of the extent to
which cyclical imbalances need to unwind and to
which policies need to react. Furthermore, these
imbalances can now unwind while maintaining a
pace of economic growth that until quite recently
would have been considered reasonable macroeco-
nomic performance.
Low inflation and stable inflation expectations
The rise in oil prices since early 1999 has had little
effect so far on underlying inflation trends.
Excluding food and energy, the four-quarter
changes in US consumer prices have increased
only slightly (Figure 4). Consumer prices in the
euro area have also remained low. In addition,
there are no signs of higher long-term inflation
expectations in the United States and a number of
other economies, based on measures of inflation
expectations derived from consumer and producer
surveys, as well as from regular and index-linked
government bonds. Market long-term inflation
forecasts also continue to be low and stable rela-
tive to current inflation in the United States and
Europe (Figure 5).These developments are all the
more remarkable given that many economies have
been either above estimated measures of potential
output (e.g.the United States,the United Kingdom
and Canada) or approaching it, in some cases
rapidly (e.g. the euro area).The exception is Japan,
where deflation is continuing.
It is noteworthy that the general pattern of modest
inflation outcomes has been occurring for a while
and has not been well anticipated by forecasters.
For example, while OECD projection errors for
GDP have been somewhat evenly distributed
around zero over the period from 1993 to 1999,
projection errors for inflation over the past decade
have generally been negative, indicating that actu-
al inflation outcomes have generally been below
the projections (Figure 6). This may highlight the
occurrence of an important regime change in the
state of inflation expectations, possibly linked to
the success in the setting and conduct of monetary
policy.
Improved employment conditions in the euro area
Labour market trends in the euro area have been
favourable in recent years. More or less compre-
hensive reforms have been undertaken in many
countries, with all of them adopting measures that
lower labour costs and/or raise real wage flexibili-
ty. Also, reflecting policy measures to make
European labour markets more flexible, part-time
and temporary employment has contributed very
significantly to overall employment growth. Thisployment rate has declined
from a peak of 11.5 per cent of
the labour force to around 9 per
cent, even as the participation
rate improved.
High consumer confidence in
Europe
Consumer confidence, accord-
ing to the European Com-
mission Survey, remains near
record levels in Europe, even if
some signs of softening are
beginning to appear (Figure 7).
Provided that labour market
trends continue to be favour-
able and that equity prices
remain around their current
levels, consumption should
remain healthy. It is notable
that consumer confidence mea-
sures in Europe have remained
relatively strong overall, de-
spite the sharp downturn in the
United States.
Modest adjustment of the euro
The recent period has also wit-
nessed a reversal in the foreign
exchange value of the euro,
which until October-November
of last year had been on a
declining trend since its incep-
tion. This sustained decline
prompted renewed questions
by some commentators about
the relationship between for-
eign exchange market develop-
ments and economic funda-
mentals. The slide of the euro
elicited both verbal and, ulti-
mately, market intervention on
the part of monetary authori-
ties in Europe and elsewhere.
The recent turnaround of the
euro against the dollar and the
yen constitutes, at this point,
only a small reversal of its ear-
lier slide. However, this reversal is consistent with
a shift in views about the relative strength of eco-
nomic activity in the euro area in the past few
has occurred while demand conditions have been
gradually improving, and it has been reflected in
employment growth exceeding, over the past three






Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Figure 4: Actual and core inflation in major OECD areas and




months and may mark the beginning of a period in
which exchange rate movements contribute to the
overall adjustment towards longer-run equili-
brium.
More troubling developments
There is more uncertainty
about certain other aspects of
recent developments, which
may serve to prolong or com-
plicate the adjustment period.
Balance sheets in the United
States
Balance sheet positions in the
United States, which were
important in prolonging the US
recession of the early 1990s, do
not appear to be restraining
activity to the same extent now.
By most accounts, US banks are
well-capitalised. Therefore,
banks should not be reluctant to
lend on the grounds that they
need to work down bad debts or
build up capital, as they were at
the beginning of the 1990s. Non-
financial corporations also
appear to have reasonably com-
fortable balance sheet positions.
While the debt levels of these
firms have moved above previ-
ous highs, debt positions are
quite low relative to the market
value of enterprises (Figure 8).
Furthermore, with interest rates
low, net interest payments rela-
tive to cash flow are at easily
sustainable levels. The house-
hold sector, however, is perhaps
one area where some concern
over balance sheets may arise.
Debt loads are high and,
because of the high levels of
debt, debt-servicing costs have
grown to be close to the peak
levels of ten to fifteen years ago
(Figure 9). Offsetting these con-
cerns, to some extent, are the
relatively large holdings of liq-
uid assets, which appear to offer a substantial cush-
ion to households, although mutual fund holdings
comprise a significant portion of this buffer, and
their values may fall with equity prices.
Figure 5: Long-term Inflation Forecasts According to 
Consensus Forecasts
Source: Consensus Forecasts (October 2000).
a) Unweighted average of projection errors for inflation and real GDP growth (actual minus
projected) from 1993 to 1999.Projections are from the December Economic Outlook for the
next year. Changing the starting date of the sample does not materially change the results.
Figure 6U.S. over-investment
Fuelling the exceptional growth performance of the
United States, particularly in the period from mid-
1999 through to the first half of 2000, were rapid
increases in investment spending. Growth during
this period was well above even the upwardly
revised estimates of potential output growth for the
United States, and, combined
with an economy that seemed
already to be running beyond
the limits of its capacity, it
appeared that a period of down-
ward adjustment would be
inevitable. The decisions by the
Federal Reserve to cumulatively
raise short-term interest rates
by 175 basis points between
June 1999 and May 2000 were
designed to help unwind this
imbalance. Tighter monetary
conditions may have started to
bite in the second half of 2000,
but that may have come too late
to prevent a significant amount
of over-investment in capital
goods and consumer durables.
How long it will take to com-
plete this adjustment is not
obvious, although continuing
price declines for ICT equip-
ment and software and its rapid
depreciation should work to
shorten the process to some
extent.
Japan
The chances that growth in
Japan might deteriorate again
look to have increased. If a
downturn occurred, the situa-
tion would be made all the
more difficult by the underlying
structural problems. Balance
sheet problems, which reflect
poor future prospects for the
heavily indebted parts of the
corporate sector,are continuing
to act as perhaps the major
restraining force on growth.
While dealing with them will
create “head winds”, delaying
appropriate responses will only exacerbate the
problem. In addition, despite the measures taken
in March 1999 to address pressing problems with
financial institutions, many underlying problems
remain with the banking sector (particularly the
major banks). Furthermore, as bankruptcy proce-
dures continue to gather pace, the recognition is








Figure 7: Confidence Indicators
a) Consumer sentiment is measured as 100 plus the balance of positive minus negative opin-
ions. Purchasing managers’ deliveries (15%) and inventories (10%). – b) Consumer sentiment
is calculated as an average of five indicators concerning household standard of living, income
growth, commodity price increases, employment environment and optimal time for durable
goods purchases. The business situation prospects is the balance of positive over negative
replies expressed as a percentage of total replied to questions concerning the business situa-
tion, stocks of finished goods and capacity utilisation. – c) Consumer sentiment refers to the
average balance of positive and negative opinions on the expected financial situation,expect-
ed general economic situation and advantage to make major purchases at present. The pur-
chasing managers’ index refers to the average balance of opinions on production expecta-
tions, order-books and stocks.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.CESifo Forum 11
Focus
Outlook: positive
growth in the U.S.
visions for bad loans (and disposing of bad loans is
made more difficult by the small size of the market
for asset-backed securities as well as the lengthy
and inefficient bankruptcy procedures, which have
nonetheless improved recently).
This effect could be compounded as the true extent
of losses in the non-financial sector are recognised
(following the introduction of tighter accounting
standards) and by any additional weakness in real
estate prices that might emerge, as banks typically
value collateral at historical value and only provi-
sion against the difference. Finally, bank loans have
fallen, as major sound clients restructure their own
balance sheets, and loan margins remain low. There
are also severe problems in the life insurance indus-
try, where firms have extensive cross holdings with
the banking sector. These problems stem from high
promised returns, which in a number of cases now
cannot be met and which can only be altered during
bankruptcy proceedings. A restructuring system is
in place, and a safety net, smaller than that for the
banks,has also been established.
Nevertheless, the industry is
likely to come under further
stress in the period ahead.
Turkey
An important concern is the
risk of contagion to other
emerging market economies
from the crisis in Turkey. One
cannot predict with certainty
what kinds of spillovers might
result from the crisis in Turkey.
Certainly those with exposure
to Turkey will be affected. It is
clear, however, that the Turkish
crisis is very much linked to
specific conditions in that coun-
try; and also that widespread
international exposure to
Turkish risk is not very high.
These considerations suggest
that spillovers, if any, should be
modest and short-lived.
Tentative outlook and risks
Our preliminary analysis leads
us to think that the US economy
is currently going through a peri-
od of needed adjustment.To be sure, it started earli-
er and more abruptly than all analysts and commen-
tators had anticipated. But going forward, it appears
that two different scenarios are likely.The more pes-
simistic scenario calls for a recession in the United
States, which in the worst case could be protracted
and have significant spillover effects on the rest of
the world. The more optimistic scenario, which
appears to be held by most analysts and towards
which I personally lean at this point in time, is for
significantly lower but still positive growth in 2001.
This means that GDP growth might end up being,
overall, around 2 per cent in the current year, and
higher for 2002. This central scenario acknowledges
that a sharp slowdown has occurred,but expects also
the speed of correction to be relatively rapid,as tem-
porary conditions pass, fuel prices stabilise or ease,
potential output growth remains strong, and capital
stock adjustment is concentrated in the rapidly
evolving ICT sector. The sharp easing of US mone-
tary policy in January and possible further cuts in
interest rates will also serve to speed the adjustment.
Figure 8Slower growth in the United States will obviously
bear on the economic outlook in the other major
economic areas. But the impact on the rest of the
world appears at this point to be manageable in
most countries. Simulation results from the
OECD’s Interlink model show that, considering
the direct trade linkages, a decline of US GDP
growth of 1 to 11/2 percentage points – about the
magnitude of the recent adjustment to expecta-
tions for US growth in 2001 – would ceteris
paribus lead to declines of roughly 1/2 of a per-
centage point for growth rates in both Europe and
Japan.
Nonetheless, the short-term
outlook for Europe appears to
remain solid. The high level of
business and consumer confi-
dence, the employment gains,
and the tax cuts implemented in
some countries should under-
pin growth in domestic demand
and without stoking inflation-
ary pressures. Recent falls in
equity prices may detract from
private demand, but the magni-
tudes should be buffered by the
small proportion of European
net worth held in the form of
listed company stocks. A mod-
est slowdown in activity with
respect to 2000 is nonetheless
the most likely outcome. As
core inflation is predicted to
remain low, there would proba-
bly be little risk to implement-
ing some modest monetary eas-
ing relatively soon. In the event
the size of the external shock is
larger than anticipated,or if the
domestic conjuncture substan-
tially deteriorates, there would
remain considerable scope to
counter such weakness with fur-
ther monetary policy easing.
In Japan, however, the monetary
authorities may not see them-
selves as having the same degree
of freedom.With policy targeting
an interest rate that is already
close to zero, further substantial
easing to counter the decline in
external demand might require
alternative, quantitative mea-
sures for the injection of liquidity, such as through
outright purchases of government bonds or foreign
exchange.Absent such easing, Japan might suffer an
even larger decline in aggregate demand if the yen
were to rise in reaction to the relative easing of mon-
etary policies elsewhere.Likewise,the scope to stim-
ulate demand through expansionary fiscal policy is
severely constrained by the already large budget
deficit and rapidly growing size of outstanding gov-
ernment debt.
Outside the OECD area, the reduction of global







Figure 9: Debt and Debt-Servicing Measures of U.S. Households
and Non-Profit Organisations Relative to Disposable 
Personal Income
a) Home mortgage and consumer credit. – b) Deposits, credit market instruments and mutual
funds.






financing costs in emerging markets. Most of these
countries are also in a position to counter the effects
of a slowdown in external demand by easing mone-
tary policy. The impact, however, of the ICT stock
adjustment in the United States may hit some coun-
tries in dynamic Asia hard, since a sizeable share of
their output and exports comprise ICT components
and equipment.
Risks
One risk to the outlook, however, is a more gener-
alised cutback in investment and consumption out-
lays in the United States, which would detract from
growth in domestic demand and, in time, impinge
negatively on the US economy’s growth potential.So
far disappointing returns and revised profit expecta-
tions have been concentrated among high technology
investments. And the slide in equity prices, which
persisted through to the end of the year, has been
largely in these sectors.There is a risk, however, that
equity markets continue to fall,triggering even steep-
er declines in consumer and business confidence.
Such declines in confidence might in turn affect con-
sumption and investment spending for a more pro-
tracted period,generating a more negative impact on
domestic demand and larger spillover effects to the
rest of the world.However,there is still scope for fur-
ther monetary policy easing,which would tend to off-
set some of these negative effects on growth in the
United States and elsewhere.
Another, perhaps less likely, risk to the outlook
arises if the impacts of higher energy prices are still
to be fully felt. If the increases we have seen ulti-
mately do pass through to core inflation and infla-
tion expectations, especially at a time when output
growth is slowing, they could complicate the policy
response to the slowdown in activity throughout
the OECD area.
Challenges for policy makers
The current economic environment, which in many
respects is quite favourable, presents at the same
time some difficult challenges for policy makers. In
part this stems from recent changes in the nature of
economic activity and the patterns of economic
behaviour. For example, equities have in recent
years become an important component of U.S.
household wealth, with equity market develop-
ments exerting a stronger influence on consumption
behaviour through fluctuations in wealth and
through confidence. As a consequence, U.S. con-
sumption spending may be becoming more volatile
and difficult to forecast than it had been in the past.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the relationships
among inflation, inflation expectations, labour
market pressures and fuel prices may have
changed. Perhaps because of increased flexibility
of labour and product markets and/or increased
confidence in monetary policy making, inflation
and inflation expectations seem to be responding
less, in the current environment, to wage and com-
modity price pressures.
The increased rate of potential output growth in the
United States, which has altered the speed limit for
the economy, and the greater share of capital stock
devoted to information and computing equipment,
which depreciates more rapidly and would lead to
faster unwinding of stock adjustment imbalances,
also change key economic relationships.As a result,
policy makers will need to be prepared to come to
grips with new developments, to look for changes in
relationships and indicators, and to adapt their poli-
cies as needed to the evolving character of econom-
ic activity.The success policy makers have in under-
standing and adapting to the new environment will
have an important influence on the way in which the
world economy evolves.
This is a very general prescription and implement-
ing it in specific situations will, of course, be diffi-
cult.At the moment, one of the key challenges fac-
ing the United States is to avoid over-reacting to
the slowing of economic growth, which might fos-
ter more volatility in activity and risk dissipating
hard-won gains against inflation. This task is com-
plicated by the difficulty of measuring potential
with a high degree of precision, making policy set-
ting uncertain. For Japan, the main challenge con-
tinues to be to devise the right policy configuration
to avoid deflation and spark self-sustaining eco-
nomic activity.This will likely require the rigorous
implementation of financial system reforms, vigor-
ous structural changes and the perhaps creative
use of existing macro policy tools. For Europe, the
challenge is to continue with smooth, non-infla-
tionary growth while at the same time to boost the
growth rate of potential, which may come with the
further diffusion of information and communica-
tion technology and a higher degree of exposure to
competition in product markets.